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Abstract
The analysis of the temporal structure of canonical general relativity and the con-
nected interpretational questions with regard to the role of time within the theory both
rest upon the need to respect the fundamentally dual role of the Hamiltonian con-
straints found within the formalism. Any consistent philosophical approach towards
the theory must pay dues to the role of these constraints in both generating dynamics,
in the context of phase space, and generating unphysical symmetry transformations,
in the context of a hypersurface embedded within a solution. A first denial of time in
the terms of a position of reductive temporal relationalism can be shown to be troubled
by failure on the first count, and a second denial in the terms of Machian temporal
relationalism can be found to be hampered by failure on the second. A third denial of
time, consistent with both the of the Hamiltonian constraints roles, is constituted by
the implementation of a scheme for constructing observables in terms of correlations
and leads to a radical Parmenidean timelessness. The motivation for and implications
of each of these three denials are investigated.
Keywords: Problem of Time, Canonical Gravity, Constraints, Symmetry,
Observables, Relationalism
1. Introduction
That the boundary between physics and philosophy is often found to be a vague one
should perhaps not surprise us given the overlapping concerns of the two disciplines. Yet
that these concerns may be not just overlapping but entangled, and that the boundary
may be not just vague but illusory would, if it were to prove to be the case, be highly
non-trivial. It is within this controversial and treacherous border-lands, where physics
meets philosophy, that the deniers of time may conspire with the interpreters of general
relativity.
In this paper we will investigate the sense in which the particular physico-mathematical
formalism that is constituted by the canonical formulation of general relativity may be
taken to motivate a denial of temporality. In particular, we will examine three ap-
proaches towards canonical gravity that underpin three distinct senses in which the
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theory may be interpreted as timeless. In each case a stance as to how to understand
certain aspects of the formalism shall be shown to be entwined with a philosophical
position as to the nature of time; and in each case we shall find that in addition to
the physical formalism motivating a philosophical position, the relevant interpretative
considerations may be seen to motivate a position with regard to the formalism.
Our analysis is intended to be as metaphysically sparse as is possible: when we
talk of denying time we will only do so in the sense of asserting that a particular
weakened notion of temporality is associated with the particular interpretation of the
physical theory in question. In other words, we will not here aim to investigate the
‘denial of time’ in the sense of a strong ontological claim. Rather, we will principally
be concerned with consideration of two more limited questions with regard to each
of the three interpretations: i) to what extent, and in what sense, would adoption of
the interpretation lead us to dispense with aspects of the ‘typical’ temporal structure
of physical theory2; and ii) to what extent is the interpretation consistent with, and
well motivated by, the formalism of the theory. Furthermore, we will hold no prior
expectation that any one interpretation will be uniquely well motivated by the formalism
– it may prove the case that all or none of them may be reasonably endorsed. These
qualifications aside, it should be remembered that as general relativity is at the moment
the only physical theory which can accurately predict the behaviour of clocks, the
investigation of the temporal ontology to which it can be associated must be considered
the overriding concern of any scientifically well informed metaphysics of time. Thus,
although we will not here be immediately concerned with the conceptual subtleties
involved within making a ‘ontologically thick’ denial of time, readers interested in such
matters are likely to find the material presented of significant interest.
Our first denial of time will be predicated upon passage to formalism within which
only static universes may be represented. Thus, it involves an interpretation of general
relativity in which there is no change because there is no non-trivial dynamical structure
at all. This denial is in part motivated by application of the standard machinery for
dealing with the Hamiltonian formulation of a theory displaying gauge symmetry, and in
part by a desire to implement a reductive notion of spacetime relationalism specifically
within the Hamiltonian or canonical formulation of general relativity. Ultimately, it
shall be found to rest on a misunderstanding of the extent to which canonical general
relativity can be treated as a standard gauge theory. Although this approach will lead to
a formalism amenable to the philosophical goals which at least partially motivate it, we
shall find that this formalism is fundamentally inadequate for representing dynamically
non-trivial universes. Thus, both the basis for and implications of the first of our denials
will themselves be denied.
As well as differing from the first in terms of the formal moves involved, the second
of our denials differs as to the philosophical stance with regard to time that it motivates,
2By this we mean both mathematical features, such as one-dimensionally, metricity, topological
structure and point type structure, as well as the more physical features, such as non-trivial dynamical
change and ordering of distinct instantaneous spatial configurations.
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and that it is motivated by. In this context the denial of time amounts to a far weaker
assertion that metrical temporal structure has a secondary, derived nature – being
constituted parasitically upon relations between distinct instantaneous spatial states.
The fundamental structure of our ontology is taken to be a one dimensional ordering of
spatial states (in this sense the second denial retains the topological aspect of time) and
in accordance with a Machian notion of dynamics, time is seen to emerge equitably and
uniquely within the formalism. The viability of this approach will be seen to rest upon
whether a methodology can be found to respond to a problem of indeterminism that
is generic within gauge theory and is, in fact, one of aspect of the motivation for our
erroneous first denial. Two responses shall be considered, but only the second, which
involves a radical adjustment to the role of absolute scale within general relativity, will
be found to be consistent with the philosophical framework for denying time with which
we are concerned.
Our third and final denial of time will be found to be both more tenable than the
first and stronger than the second. The capacity to represent dynamical universes will
be retained, and yet the notions of both time and change will be dispensed with. Under
this interpretation the ontology of the theory consists of correlations which are effec-
tively smeared non-locally across entire histories. However, since these perennials come
in families they may collectively be used to represent worlds which have dynamical
structure beyond the trivial. Interestingly, although this denial corresponds to a funda-
mental denial of change in a Parmenidean sense, it still allows us to maintain exactly
the fundamental four-dimensionality of ontology that is dispensed within the weaker
second denial.
Before we embark on the main body of our discussion we must first consider carefully
canonical general relativity by itself, both with regard to its formal structure, and its
relationship with the original covariant formulation of the theory.
2. General Relativity and The Problem of Time
2.1. The Canonical Theory
Consider the covariant formulation of Einstein’s general theory of relativity (in
vacuo) according to the Einstein-Hilbert action:
S =
1
κ
∫
M
d4x
√
|det(g)|R =
∫
M
d4xLEH (1)
where M is a four dimensional manifold which we assume to be spatially compact
without boundary and have an arbitrary topology (up to its compatibly with differential
structure), gµν is a metric tensor field of Lorentzian signature, R is the Ricci scalar, and
κ = 16piG (where G is Newton’s constant and we assume units where c = 1). Variation
of this action according to a least action principle leads to the Einstein field equations
the solution of which leads to an expression for the metric tensor. This tensor equips
the manifold M with a geometry and thus we arrive at the set of four geometries,
(M, gµν), that we understand as representing the spacetimes which are nomologically
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admissible under the theory. As well as providing us with the solutions, the action also
gives us a precise methodology for defining the fundamental symmetries of the theory
in terms of the Lagrangian LEH and the Noether symmetry condition:
δLEH = ∂µ(µLEH) (2)
which is satisfied for any active variation of the gravitational field variable (i.e. the
metric tensor) induced by the infinitesimal coordinate transformations xµ → xµ −
µ(x). The set of all such infinitesimal coordinate transformations forms the group of
diffeomorphism of the manifoldM that we will take to constitute the fundamental local
symmetry group of the covariant formalism.3 Each of these two basic elements to the
theory (i.e. solutions and symmetry group) are four dimensional and are understood as
corresponding to four dimensional concepts; spacetimes and symmetries of spacetime.
As such, the analysis of either is unlikely to elucidate much with regard to the specific
role of time within the theory. Rather, we are better placed to understand the temporal
structure of general relativity by passing from the covariant formulation to one which is
predicate upon space and time rather than spacetime. We shall achieve this by focusing
on the canonical formulation of general relativity.
The canonical formulation of general relativity has its origin the work of Paul Dirac
and Peter Bergmann towards towards the construction of a quantum theory of gravity.
Important early work can be found in Bergmann (1949) and Dirac (1950), the crucial
result was first given in Dirac (1958) (according to Salisbury (2012) the same Hamilto-
nian was obtained independently at about the same time by B. DeWitt and also by J.
Anderson).4 Here the canonical formalism will be concisely presented according to the
‘ADM’ formulation due to Arnowitt, Deser, and Misner (1960, 1962).
We first make the assumption that the manifoldM has a topology which is such that
M∼= R× σ where σ is a three dimensional manifold with an arbitrary (differentiable)
topology that we will again assume to be spatially compact and without boundary.5
What philosophical significance, if any, we should attach to this non-trivial topological
requirement will be discussed in the following subsection. Next we define the foliation of
M into hypersurfaces Σt := Xt(σ) where t ∈ R andXt : σ →M is an embedding defined
by Xt(x) := X(t, x) for the coordinates x
a on σ. What we are interested in specifically
is the foliation of a spacetime,M, into spacelike hypersurfaces, Σt - so we must restrict
ourselves to arbitrary spacelike embeddings. The lengthly process of decomposing the
3As pointed out by Pons, Salisbury, and Sundermeyer (2010) general relativity actually admits the
larger symmetry group of field-dependent infinitesimal co-ordinate transformations and so Diff(M)
is properly a sub-group of the fundamental symmetry group. This difference will not be important for
our purposes.
4Also see Salisbury (2007, 2010) for account of little known early work due to Le´on Rosenfeld.
5Although fairly standard, this choice of boundary conditions can be seen to have significant impact
upon nature of the problem at hand. Under an alternative choice where we assume asymptotically flat
spacetimes, the situation with regard to symmetries and the constraints is found to be quite different
from that considered below (e.g. Arnowitt et al. (1960)). See Lusanna (2011) for more detailed
discussion of this point.
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Einstein-Hilbert action in terms of tensor fields defined upon the hypersurfaces and
the coefficients used to parameterise the embedding (the lapse and shift below) then
leads to a Lagrangian formulation of general relativity in terms of space and time rather
than spacetime (see Thiemann (2007) for a full treatment). Finally, recasting this ‘3+1’
Lagrangian formalism into canonical terms gives us the ADM-action:
S =
1
κ
∫
R
dt
∫
σ
d3x{q˙abP ab − [NaHa + |N |H]} (3)
Here qab is a metric tensor field on σ and P
ab its canonical momenta defined by the
usual Legendre transformation. N and Na are arbitrary multipliers called the lapse
and shift. Ha and H are constraint functions of the form:
Ha := −2qacDbP bc (4)
H :=
sκ√
det(q)
[qacqbd − 1
2
qabqcd]P
abP cd −
√
det(q)
R
κ
(5)
where s is the metric signature (i.e. −1 for Lorentzian, +1 for Euclidian) These are
called the momentum and Hamiltonian constraints respectively and (like typical con-
straints) can be understood as defining a physical phase space Π in terms of a sub-
manifold (the constraint surface) within the extended phase space Γ(q, P ):
Π = {(qab, P ab) = x ∈ Γ|Ha(x) = 0;H(x) = 0} (6)
Beyond their uncontroversial role in defining this sub-manifold, the interpretation of
the meaning of these constraint functions is a subtle business. In a typical constrained
Hamiltonian theory it is assumed that if, as in this case, the constraints are first class
(i.e. have a vanishing Poisson bracket on the constraint surface with all the other
constraints) then they should be taken to generate unphysical transformations of the
canonical variables and to have their origin directly in the local symmetries of the
covariant formalism (e.g. see Dirac (1964) or Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992)). The
extent to which canonical general relativity is not a typical constrained Hamiltonian
theory in these senses and the consequent interpretation of the constraint functions is
the decisive issue that will inform much of our discussion.
2.2. Canonical vs. Covariant Formalisms
To what extent does the canonical formalism capture the same content as the co-
variant formulation? We can evaluated the answer to this question in two parts: i) is
an equivalent set of solutions represented in the space and time formalism as was fixed
by the spacetime formalism?; and ii) are an equivalent set of local symmetry transfor-
mations implemented upon the canonical phase space as where found to hold within
the covariant configuration space (i.e. the space of four-metrics)?
Focusing on the first question first. Following Isham (1992) we have that given a
Lorentzian spacetime as represented by the geometry (M, g), if this constraint equa-
tions (4) and (5) are satisfied on every spacelike hypersurface, then g will also satisfy
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the Einstein field equations. Conversely, we can also show that given a (M, g) that
satisfies the Einstein field equations, then the constraint equations will be satisfied on
all spacelike hypersurfaces of M. This means that the solutions presented to us by
the two formalism are equivalent provided the covariant spacetime can be expressed in
terms of a sequence of space-like hypersurfaces. This requirement is equivalent to in-
sisting that spacetimes in question are restricted to be globally hyperbolic (see Geroch
(1970)) and is of course directly connected to the topological restriction M ∼= R × σ
which was made in setting up the canonical formalism.
At first sight this might seem to render the canonical formalism fundamentally inad-
equate for describing the same spacetime ontology as the covariant formalism. However,
this objection that the requirement of globally hyperbolicity renders the canonical for-
mulation of general relativity representatively deficient in comparison to the covariant
formalism should not be overstated. By insisting that our spacetime is globally hyper-
bolic we are only requiring the existence of a Cauchy surface in M, meaning that the
only solutions that have been excluded are those inconsistent with the kind of basic
notion of causality and determinism that we would prima facie have expected to hold
within a classical theory anyway. The physical content of non-globally hyperbolic so-
lutions seems hard to countenance since they included strange objects such as closed
time-like curves and in terms of the empirical content of the theory nothing has been
lost since all observational data refers to globally hyperbolic solutions.6 Within quan-
tum gravity there is of course the possibility that we may need access to different kinds
of topologies – or, in fact, perhaps even topology changes! However, the reasoning
behind lifting the topological requirement at a quantum level do not impinge on its
classical status. To the extent to which the solutions of covariant general relativity can
be understood as representing physically reasonable spacetimes the solutions of covari-
ant general relativity can equally be thought of representing these spacetimes (albeit
in terms of space and time).
Still, it is true that since canonical general relativity is well defined on a set of
solutions which is a subset of those of covariant general relativity, in moving from one
formalism from the other we are removing from our theoretical toolkit the ability to
represent a class of nomologically possible worlds. Furthermore, although these worlds
might seem unreasonable because of their strange causal structure, to exclude them in
principle from a philosophical analysis of the nature of time in general relativity would
be to seriously beg the question. Asserting a causal censorship condition excluding the
non-globally hyperbolic solutions as an additional law of nature is a highly non-trivial
move which we will not here propose to make. Rather, one straight-forward option
is to invert the supposed deficiency into a strength and make global hyperbolicity a
prediction rather than a restriction. Such a move depends on our ability to see the
canonical formalism on an equal footing to its covariant counterpart, and not as purely
6For an analysis of the connection between non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes, closed time-like
curves and the possibility of time machines see Smeenk and Wuthrich (2009)
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parasitic upon it. This we can do by pointing to the fact that – as shown by Hojman,
Kucharˇ, and Teitelboim (1976) – it is possible to derive canonical general relativity
without passing through the covariant formalism.7
Such a manoeuvre will be crucial to the assessment of our second denial of time and
we will be further discussed in §4.3. Alternatively, we can simply fall back on a weakened
stance: this analysis and its conclusions with regard to the nature of time carry with
them a global parenthesis of given the restriction to the globally hyperbolic sub-set of
solutions. Since our principal object is to examine issues relating to diffeomorphism
symmetry and the ontological status of a linear one dimensional notion of temporality,
our discussion can bear this qualification without any undue burden or inconsistency.
More significant to our purpose is the relationship between the local symmetry
transformations of the two formalisms. Whereas, as discussed above, the covariant
action is invariant under the full set of spacetime diffeomorphisms Diff(M), in the
canonical formulation it is only a sub-set of these transformations that is realised.
This sub-set can be shown (e.g. Pons et al. (2010)) to be infinitesimal coordinate
transformations xµ → xµ − µ(x) such that:
µ(x) = nµ(x)ξ0 + δµa ξ
a (7)
where nµ = (N−1,−N−1Na) and here the ξµ are taken to be arbitrary functions of
the coordinates. From the persecutive of the derivation of canonical general relativity
from covariant general relativity, the basis of this discrepancy between the symmetry
transformations realised in the two formalism is well understood – it can be explained
in terms of the spacelike nature of the otherwise arbitrary embedding (see Isham and
Kucharˇ (1985)) or (relatedly) in the context of non-complete projectability between the
symmetry transformations defined in the relevant tangent bundle and cotangent bundle
structures (see Pons, Salisbury, and Shepley (1997)).
Alternatively, we can consider the elegant and important derivation of these canon-
ical symmetry transformations purely in terms of a deformation algebra pertaining
to spacelike hypersurfaces embedded in a Riemannian spacetime (Teitelboim (1973)).
This treatment gives us a basis for the canonical symmetry transformations indepen-
dent of the covariant theory and implies that we can understand them as encoding
physical content not purely dependent upon four dimensional diffeomorphism symme-
try. Crucially, this treatment also makes clear the deep connection between the form
of the constraints and the nature of the symmetries. In fact, what is shown is that this
canonical symmetry group (known as the Bergmann-Komar group BK) is and must
be generated by constraints of the specific form (4-5), which will inevitably satisfy the
constraint algebra:
{ ~H( ~N), ~H( ~N ′)} = −κ ~H(LNaN ′a) (8)
7For discussion on this ‘HKT’ derivation and an insightful comparison to the related (although
differently motivated approach) ‘3-space’ derivation see Anderson (2007).
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{ ~H( ~N), H(N)} = −κH(LNaN) (9)
{H(N), H(N ′)} = sκ ~H(F (N,N ′, q)) (10)
whereH(N) and ~H( ~N) are smeared versions of the constraints (e.g. ~H( ~N) :=
∫
σ
d3xNaHa)
and F (N,N ′, q) = qab(NN ′,b−N ′N,b). The presence of structure functions on the right
hand side of (10) means that strictly BK is not a group (and that the constraint algebra
is not a Lie algebra) and of course emphasises that Diff(M) 6= BK.
Despite these important differences the symmetries of the covariant and canonical
formalism can in fact be shown to be physically equivalent since, given a solution to the
equations of motion within the canonical formalism, the action of BK will coincide with
that ofDiff(M) (for diffeomorphisms connected with the identity). Thus, at a classical
level at least there is no detectable difference. We can, in fact, explicitly construct a
canonical symmetry generator acting upon the space of solutions that maps between
the same diffeomorphic spacetimes which we would take to be symmetry related in
the covariant formalism (see Pons et al. (2010) and references therein for more details).
Thus, so long as we are concerned with globally hyperbolic solutions, the two formalisms
admit identical symmetry relations.
2.3. Time and the Riddle of the Hamiltonian Constraints
In the discussion above the constraints of the canonical formalism were found to
be involved in fixing both the dynamics and symmetries to be in accordance with the
physics of covariant general relativity. This dual symmetry/dynamics aspect has lead
to much confusion with regard to the interpretation of the constraints of the theory –
in particular the Hamiltonian constraints – and is at the root of the problem of time
in canonical gravity. Whereas the momentum constraints can be understood unam-
biguously as implementing infinitesimal diffeomorphisms on phase space, the role of the
Hamiltonian constraints is far more opaque. We can see this explicitly by considering
the form of the Poisson brackets between each constraint and the canonical variables.
For the momentum constraints it takes the form:
{ ~H( ~N), qab} = κ(L ~Nqab) (11)
{ ~H( ~N), P ab} = κ(L ~NP ab) (12)
The appearance of the Lie derivative on the right hand side of each equation indicates
that these constraints can be understood as purely generating infinitesimal diffeomor-
phisms of the phase space variables. In fact it means that the momentum constraints
can on their own be understood as implementing the Lie group of diffeomorphisms of
the space-like hypersurface σ (Isham and Kucharˇ (1985)).
The Hamiltonian constraints, in stark contrast, have a phase space action which
seems, prima facie, manifestly dynamical. Considered acting on the constraint surface,
for any specification of the lapse they effect an infinitesimal phase space transformation
from the canonical variables characterising a given three geometry, to those describing
a second three geometry which is dynamically subsequent. Thus, one might imagine
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that – like with a typical Hamiltonian function – the action of Hamiltonian constraints
is purely dynamical in nature. More careful analysis, however, reveals a dual, context
dependent role, within which the seeds of our conceptual enigma are sown.
In Equations (11) and (12) above the connection between the momentum constraints
and infinitesimal diffeomorphisms is made explicit by the occurrence of the Lie deriva-
tives of the canonical variables in the direction defined by the shift multiplier, L ~Nqab
and L ~NP
ab. The form of these expressions indicate that the phase space action of
~H( ~N) can be associated with diffeomorphisms of the original spacetime manifold, M,
which preserve the foliation Σt. Clearly, this does not exhaust the set of possible dif-
feomorphisms that can be represented within the canonical formalism since we may
also consider diffeomorphisms of M which are orthogonal to Σt – these would be the
‘time bit’ of the spacetime diffeomorphism group, as opposed to the ‘space bit’ . In
order that we can represent the full set of the canonical symmetries of the theory – and
obtain equivalence to the symmetries of the covariant theory up to the qualifications of
the previous section – we might therefore hope that the Hamiltonian constraints can
be associated with an action of the form:
{H(N), qab} = κ(LNnqab)
{H(N), P ab} = κ(LNnP ab)
However, the equations above are not found in explicit calculation (see Thiemann (2007)
Eq. (1.3.4) and (1.3.12)). Rather, what is found is that in the case of the metric variable
qab, the expected LNnqab piece emerges only ‘on shell’ – i.e. only when the equations of
motion hold. Similarly, after a much involved calculation (Thiemann (2007, pp.54-6)) it
can be shown that the action of H(N) upon an embedded canonical momenta variable8
again yields the appropriate expression only when the equations of motion (and the
constraints) hold. This qualification on the connection between diffeomorphism sym-
metry and the action of the Hamiltonian constraints is the precise reason behind the
similar qualification in connection between BK and Diff(M) as discussed in the last
section. We therefore have that, whereas the diffeomorphisms associated with the mo-
mentum constraints can be understood as purely kinematical symmetries of the three
geometries σ (irrespective of whether the equations of motion hold) those associated
with the Hamiltonian constraint are properly considered symmetries of not only entire
spacetimes, but of spacetimes which are solutions.
This leads us to the following picture of the symmetry generating role of H(N): For
a given solution and an embedded hypersurface within that solution, the Hamiltonian
8Such a variable is so called because it is the canonical conjugate of an metric variable qµν which is
a tensor field (the first fundamental form) defined on the embedded hypersurface Σt. This new metric
variable can be expressed purely in terms of spatial vector fields on Σt and the usual metric variable
on σ, qab (see Thiemann (2007, Eq. 1.1.16)). The new momenta variable can be written in terms of
qµν together with another spatial tensor field on Σt (the second fundamental form).
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constraints generate an unphysical local deformation of the hypersurface with the ar-
bitrariness encoded in the choice of lapse. For a given solution and a foliation of this
solution in terms of a sequence of hypersurfaces, collectively the action of the Hamil-
tonian constraints is equivalent to the refoliation of a spacetime and therefore to the
generation of a different unphysical splitting of spacetime into space and time. However,
the solutions themselves are consequences of the dynamical role that the Hamiltonian
constraint plays in the context of three geometries considered on their own rather than
as embedded in a spacetime.
We therefore have that the dynamical aspect to the Hamiltonian constraints action
must always be considered prior to the symmetry generating aspect. If we just start out
with canonical data on a spatial hypersurface then there is no precise way we can talk of
the unphysical role within the context mentioned above. Before we can do this we have
to build a solution and a foliation by starting from a given hypersurface with given
prescribed lapse. Nevertheless, to maintain both the fundamental symmetry of the
theory and the dynamics as consistent with the covariant formalism, in the canonical
formalism we must appreciate the essentially dual role of the Hamiltonian constraints.9
In the remaining discussion we will explore the narrow path that traverses failure
to appreciate either side of this duality and, after observing the perils of falling into
the abyss below, come upon a fork that forces us to choose between retaining a weaker
Machian notion of time, at the cost of global scale, and dispensing with time altogether.
3. Denial I: Reductive Temporal Relationalism
3.1. Gauge Theory and Symplectic Reduction
Motivation for a particularly influential (but ultimately unpersuasive) argument
towards the denial of time in canonical general relativity derives from the consideration
of the otiose representative structure constituted by the Hamiltonian formulation of
a generic gauge theory. In order to frame this argument adequately we will briefly
consider the structure of these theories in general without any particular reference to
the Hamiltonian constraints of canonical general relativity and the important subtleties
that go along with them.
Consider a gauge theory as represented by a constrained Hamiltonian formalism con-
stituted by: a phase space Γ parameterised by n canonical coordinates (p, q); a Hamil-
tonian functional H(p, q); and a set of m constraint functions ϕi(p, q) = 0.
10 Geometri-
9It is important to note that this key aspect to our analysis represents a departure from both the
received and dissenting view on this matter (although it is close to the spirit of Pons et al. (2010)).
Whereas, the received view is that the Hamiltonian constraints purely generate unphysical transfor-
mations (e.g., Rovelli (2004)), the dissenting view (which could be understood as being defended in
Barbour and Foster (2008) and also associated with Kucharˇ (1991, 1992)) is that the constraints’ ac-
tion is purely physical in character. Barbour, however, ‘suspects that the action of the Hamiltonian
constraints in GR is part physical and part gauge’ (Julian Barbour, personal communication 2012).
10See Dirac (1964) or Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992). We presume here that the constraint featured
are first class constraints whose action can be unambiguously connected to the cotangent bundle
10
cally we can characterise such a generic constrained Hamiltonian theory in precise terms.
The phase space Γ has a symplectic geometry (Γ, ω), where the symplectic form ω is a
closed non-degenerate two form.11 We can also define, by satisfaction of the constraint
conditions, the n − m dimensional sub-manifold Π = {(p, q) ∈ Γ|∀i : ϕi(p, q) = 0}.
This sub-manifold, which we designate the physical phase space since its complement
contains unphysical states which are in violation of the symmetries of the theory, has a
presymplectic geometry (Π,Ω), where the presymplectic form Ω is a closed and degen-
erate two form. Such geometries are distinguished by their degenerate structure – with
the integral curves of the vector fields that make up the null vector space (or Kernel) of
Ω partitioning Π into a set of transverse sub-manifolds called gauge orbits. In physical
terms each of these orbits have the significant feature that all of the constituent points
are physically indistinguishable – they correspond to an identical value of the Hamil-
tonian functional. Furthermore, paths in the physical phase space which differ only as
to a transformation along a gauge orbit will necessarily correspond to identical values
of the canonical action and will therefore also be indistinguishable.
Given that we make the usual interpretation of points in the (physical) phase space
as representing distinct instantaneous physical states the above feature is a form of inde-
terminism (or underdetermination) since given an initial specification of physical states
the formalism does not fix a unique continuation. This would seem unsatisfactory for
the case of classical theories, such as electromagnetism, where the relevant measurable
quantities are manifestly deterministic. The natural response in such circumstances
is to point to inadequacy within our representative formalism rather than the charac-
terisation of the connection between what is real and what is measurable within our
theories. We assert that there is ‘surplus structure’ within our formalism as embodied
precisely by the directions defined by the gauge orbits. The most obvious methodology
for controlling this excess is to classify these directions as unphysical and use points in
the space of gauge orbits to give us a unique representation of physical states.12
Formally we may construct this space of gauge orbits or reduced phase space in
terms of the quotient manifold that results from the application of a symplectic re-
duction procedure to the physical phase space Π. For simple constrained Hamiltonian
theories this reduction enacted simple by taking the quotient Π by the kernel of Ω –
see Gotay, Nester, and Hinds (1978) for the more complex case. Either way, it can be
proved (Souriau (1997)) that the space of gauge orbits that results by the application
of symplectic reduction to the physical phase space has a symplectic geometry (ΓR, ωR)
and inherits a Hamiltonian functional from the physical phase space. It is therefore
projection of a Lagrangian gauge group defined as acting on the relevant tangent bundle. As discussed
above this is of course explicitly not the case for canonical general relativity
11For a powerful yet concise introduction to these ideas Arnold, Kozlov, and Neishtadt (1988) is
highly recommended.
12Less obviously we might instead weaken the representative relationship between points and states
via the introduction of some notion of anti-haecceitism. This strategy will be examined carefully within
the particular context of time in canonical general relativity as discussed in §4.2
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equipped to describe dynamics and since we have removed the null directions and since
the space has a non-degenerate structure it is of course not afflicted with the kind of
indeterminism mentioned above. If we assign to points in the reduced phase space the
role of representing unique physical states then the formalism is now such that any
initial specification will also imply the provision of a unique continuation.
By passing to the reduced phase space of a constrained Hamiltonian theory we
reap the reward of a formalism trimmed of any superfluous representative structure.
This has lead some authors to argue that we should endow the reduced space with a
privileged status. In particular Gordon Belot and John Earman (Belot (1999, 2000,
2003, 2007); Earman (2002, 2003); and Belot and Earman (1999, 2001)) have argued
that we should consider the reduced phase space as the fundamental dynamical arena of
a gauge theory. As applied to a generic gauge theory this form of reductionism, although
open to a number of philosophical objections (e.g. see Rickles (2008)), is a viable option
and is to a large degree supported by the various techniques of canonical quantization
for gauge theories – all of which can be seen to be predicated upon the reduced phase
space.13 However, for the specific case of the Hamiltonian constraints which feature
in canonical general relativity (as well as simple theories which are reparameterisation
invariant The´bault (2012)) such reductionism rests on an inappropriate interpretation
of the Hamiltonian constraint as a pure gauge generator. We will examine this crucial
issue more carefully after first giving a second motivation for symplectic reduction that
is specific to canonical general relativity and is based on a form relationalism as to the
spacetime concepts found within the theory.
3.2. Reductive Spacetime Relationalism
The philosophical doctrine of relationalism with regard to space and time has it
roots in the early modern natural philosophy of Descartes, Leibniz and Huygens, but
(arguably) takes its most precise form in the work of Mach and Poincare´ (Barbour
(2009)). In essence, it is a position with regard to the relative ontological status of
relations between material bodies, on the one hand, and the entities or objects consti-
tuted by space and time themselves, on the other. A relationalist is taken to hold that
the relations are primary and that space and time are merely derived or abstracted
based upon them. In the context of a theory, such as general relativity, that contains a
concept of dynamical spacetime as well as matter free solutions, it is not entirely clear
what relationalism as it was originally conceived should be taken to mean, and the
modern philosophical discussion is replete with positions which are taken to be either
pro- or anti- some version of relationalism. Our purpose here will not be to survey
this literature nor explicitly analyse its connection with the indeterminism issue of the
previous section in terms of the famous hole argument.14 Rather, we will initially con-
cern ourselves with the notion of reductive spacetime relationalism that is presented
13See Belot (2007, §4.3) and The´bault (2011) for discussion of the relationship between quantization
and reduction.
14See Rickles (2008) on both counts.
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by the relevant authors in their argument towards our first denial of time. A second,
importantly different notion of temporal relationalism will be discussed in §4.2.
Among others, Belot and Earman (1999, 2001) hold that the essence of spacetime
relationalism within general relativity should be taken to be the denial of a fundamen-
tal ontological role for spacetime points. Such points are of course represented within
a covariant formalism by the coordinatisation of the manifold M and will therefore
be given distinct representations within different coordinatisations. If we assume that
cross identification between points within qualitatively identical spacetime models –
i.e. with the same geometrical structure – can be taken to ground a real difference
between these models (i.e. they may differ solely haecceitistically), then relationalism
can be understood in terms of the denial of exactly such difference on the grounds that
spacetime points do not have a fundamental ontological status.15 A spacetime relation-
alist is thus someone who will ‘deny that there could be two possible worlds with the
same geometry which differ only in virtue of the way that is geometry is shared out
over existent spacetime points’ Belot and Earman (2001, p.18). In the context of the
covariant formalism this means that two geometries (M, gµν) and (M
′, g′µν) which solve
the Einstein field equations and are related by an element of Diff(M) are considered
the same physically possible situation. This is because the difference between them
is exactly in terms of the coordinatisations rather than the geometrical structure; and
therefore the ontologies which they are taken to represent can differ (if they differ at
all) only with respect to the role played by the spacetime points. By endorsing such
a Leibniz equivalence type principle, Belot and Earman disavow this difference.16 Fur-
thermore, by cutting down the class of distinct possibilities to include only geometries
which are members of different diffeomorphic equivalence classes we have implicitly
performed a reduction with respect to our fundamental representative space. Rather
than considering the space of Riemannian four-geometries corresponding to four-metrics
which solve the Einstein field equations as our basic arena for representing the world
we instead should consider the quotient of that space by the group of four dimensional
diffeomorphisms. Thus, we can see Belot and Earman’s arguments as leading us from
relationalism to reduction: they are reductive relationalists.
What does this reductive form of spacetime relationalism mean in the context of the
canonical formalism? If we focus our attention on the role of spatial points then we have
a clear answer. In analogy to the spacetime case, spatial points are represented in terms
of the coordinatisation of a manifold, in this case the three dimensional manifold σ.
Furthermore, the action of the theory is invariant under the group of three dimensional
diffeomorphisms of this manifold, Diff(σ), and so a reconstruction of the argument
above can be made for this case. Explicitly, since two canonical solutions that differ
solely on the basis of the application of an element of Diff(σ) are physically identical,
then asserting the existence of spatial points will violate a Leibnizian type principle of
15We will, for the time being, neglect the discussion of anti-haecceitist positions. See §4.2
16There are, of course, other ways of formulating such a principle that do not have the same impli-
cations for possibility reduction. For instance that suggested by Saunders (2003)
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equivalence of exactly the same type as that in introduced via the quote from Belot
and Earman (2001) above. Thus, a reductive relationalist with regard to space will
endorse a reduced space of three geometries as representatively fundamental within the
canonical formalism. Since we have from above that Diff(σ) is implemented on phase
space by the action of the momentum constraints we know that precisely the reduced
space we are looking for can be achieved by quotienting out the gauge orbits associated
with those constraints according to the symplectic reduction procedure above. This, in
fact, leads us directly to the cotangent bundle to Wheeler’s superspace (see Wheeler
(1968), Giulini (2009)) – the ‘super-phase-space’ – upon which a formulation of canon-
ical general relativity would be constituted according to this brand of spatial reductive
relationalism.
With regard to time things are, as ever, far more complicated. One might hope to
translate a position of spacetime relationalism, as expressed in terms of the covariant
formalism, into a position of spatial relationalism plus temporal relationalism, as ex-
pressed in terms of the canonical formalism. To assert the latter, would be in essence to
deny the existence of temporal points within our basic ontology. Building on the ideas
of the previous paragraph we could hope to enact this disavowal of the fundamental
status of temporal points by enforcing ontological equivalence between solutions which
differ only as to the way in which the four dimensional geometrical structure is ‘shared
out’ over these points. Thus in effect performing a reduction of paths in super-phase-
space such that those which differ only as to how time is labelled are classified as the
same path and a new double reduced representative space is arrived at. Unfortunately
such a na¨ıve implementation of reductive temporal relationalism is neither possible nor
adequate to our purpose.
Although we have assumed that the spacetime manifoldM has a topology which is
such thatM∼= R×σ and therefore that the temporal dimension is represented in terms
of the real line, the complication of foliation invariance means that the arbitrariness
with regard to time is not fully captured merely by global temporal relabelling – i.e.
by the one dimensional diffeomorphisms group Diff(R). Furthermore, unlike spatial
diffeomorphisms these ‘temporal diffeomorphisms’ have no representation at the level
of a constraint function acting of phase space points or for that matter even phase space
paths and so (in the conventional formalism) is impossible to frame this na¨ıve temporal
relationalism simply in terms of a reduction procedure.
Foliation invariance means that the theory is invariant under the set of local tem-
poral relabelling of each point on each space-like hypersurface – the global temporal
re-labellings discussed above form a sub-set of this set. To be consistent with the no-
tion of reductive spacetime relationalism defined above it is the temporal points that
constitute this local labelling that must be excluded from our ontology via a Leibniz
equivalence inspired quotienting operation. In the case of local temporal relabelling
(unlike the global case) we do have a canonical constraint function that can be asso-
ciated with the relevant symmetry, the Hamiltonian constraint. However, as discussed
above the connection between these constraints and refoliation symmetries can only be
made precise at the level of paths in the physical phase space which are also solutions
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to the equations of motion. In the context of its action on phase space the Hamiltonian
constraint generates evolution. Thus, although it might seem at first sight that reduc-
ing out the action of the Hamiltonian constraint (on super-phase-space) will achieve
the object of reductive spacetime relationalism within the canonical formalism, our un-
derstanding of the constraints dual role leads to immediate scepticism on this count.
The object of reductive relationalism with regard to time in particular, is to construct
a representative arena in which the distinct possibilities entailed by the existence of
temporal points have been removed. Within the context of canonical general relativity
such a reduction makes sense (at least in principle) at the level of entire histories related
by a refoliation symmetry. However, it is difficult to understand how it can possibly be
achieved by a reduction of phase space since such symmetries cannot be represented in
terms of the relationship between points on this space. It is exactly this kind of phase
space reduction with regard to the Hamiltonian constraint which Belot and Earman ar-
gue implements their reductive spacetime relationalism within the canonical formalism,
and to which we now turn.
3.3. Dynamical Trivialisation and the Isomorphism Argument
We thus have two distinct but connected motivations for enacting a symplectic re-
duction of the phase space of canonical general relativity with regard to the Hamiltonian
constraints. Firstly, we have the argument from indeterminism and surplus structure
– it is assumed that as for the case of other theories with first class constraints, the
sub-manifolds defined by the integral curves of the null vector fields associated with the
Hamiltonian constraints will form gauge equivalence classes. Thus, as for the generic
case, the unreduced formalism will possess an excess representation of physical states
such that an initial specification of phase space points will admit multiple physically
identical but mathematically distinct continuations. By reducing out the action of these
constraints we will remove both this indeterminism and the redundant representative
structure that enables it. Secondly, we have the motivation from reductive spacetime
relationalism – we wish to reduce our possibility space such that differences entailed by
distinct coordinatisations of the same fundamental geometrical structure are no longer
encoded. Specifically, in addition to removing the representation of spatial points, via
reduction with respect to the momentum constraints, we also want to remove the local
temporal labellings that play the role of representing temporal points as basic structures
within the theory.
It is for both these reasons that Belot and Earman (2001, 17-18) advocate the use
of a literal reading of the reduced phase space of general relativity – it is the use of this
space that they claim allows us to both ‘avoid indeterminism’ and, in doing so, ‘deny
that there could be two possible worlds with the same geometry which differ only in
virtue of the way that this geometry is shared out over existent spacetime points’. They
explicitly make the claim that, modulo positions built upon anti-haecceitism (See §4.2),
‘one must be a [reductive] relationalist in order to give a deterministic interpretation
of general relativity’. Thus, Belot and Earman’s reductive spacetime relationalism is
directly connected to the interpretation of the reduced phase space as the fundamental
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dynamical arena. In a canonical context it is claimed to be a position such that only the
distinct possibilities entailed by the existence of spacetime points have been removed.
If ‘points of the reduced phase space are just the equivalence classes of diffeomorphic
models of general relativity’ then, prima facie, the only temporal structure we have
removed in passage to the reduced space should be the temporal points – and this would
not make for a particularly strong denial of time. However, closer analysis reveals that
the reduction has in fact removed far more temporal structure from our formalism and
thus that the reductive spacetime relationalism of Belot and Earman inevitably leads
to a far stronger denial of time.
Like in other gauge theories, the construction of a reduced phase space involves
quotienting out of the action of the first class constraints and thus, for the gravitational
case, would involving treating the phase space action of H(N) as purely symmetry
generating. However, as detailed in §2.3 and mentioned above, the role of the Hamil-
tonian constraints within canonical general relativity is essentially a dual one. When
considered as acting on a three geometry (as represented by a phase space point) they
generate dynamical evolution, and when considered as acting on space-like hypersurface
embedded within a solution they generates infinitesimal diffeomorphisms. The latter
role means that the constraint can be considered responsible for generating refolia-
tion symmetries and allows us to understand how the four dimensional diffeomorphism
symmetry is (to a certain extent) implemented canonically. However, the former role
cannot be discounted since without it the solutions within which the hypersurfaces
are embedded cannot be defined. Moreover, the gauge orbits associated with the con-
straints action on phase space are in fact closer in character to solutions themselves
and are explicitly not equivalence classes of solutions since a point with the orbit is
associated with a three not four dimensional object. Still, by (erroneously) classifying
all phase space points within these sub-manifolds as representing the same state we will
ensure that any pair of three geometries which are contained within solutions related
by a refoliation symmetry will be (again, erroneously) classified as equivalent. Thus
symplectic reduction will remove the indeterminism related to that symmetry. It will,
of course, therefore additionally mean that the reductive temporal relationalist desire
to pass to a representative space that excludes distinct local temporal labellings will
also have been achieved.
In addition to these two primary goals, however, this reduction has the dire un-
intended consequence that all dynamically related three geometries are classified as
representing the same state. This is because the orbit that is quotiented is, as it must
be by the nature of the Hamiltonian constraints phase space action, composed of every
state that can be accessed via the ‘many fingered’ time evolution the theory allows for
in terms of the action of the Hamiltonian and the arbitrariness of the lapse function.
By reducing the representative capacity of the orbit down to a single state we pass
from many fingers to no fingers – and not one finger! Furthermore, since we have not
respected the dynamical role of the Hamiltonian, in a phase space context by passing
to the reduced space we will have classified states which are physically distinct mem-
bers of a given solution as identical. This is exactly to treat the current state of the
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universe and its state just after the big bang as identical (contra the claims of Belot
(2007, p.78)). Reductive relationalism thus amounts to a far stronger denial of time
than may have been anticipated – it is not just the point structure that is dispensed
with, but also our ability to represent any more than one distinct spatial configuration
per universe: the interpretation has rendered the formalism dynamically trivial since
we can no longer represent change.17
A single line of argument is available in defence of total constraint reduction in
canonical general relativity against the charge of dynamical trivialisation. Belot (2007,
p.78) argues that rather than seeing the reduced phase space as dynamically trivial
in sense outlined above we should instead reinterpret it as a space of diffeomorphism
invariant histories. Thus, we would enable both reductive temporal relationalism and
the avoidance of indeterminism but without the cost of trivialising our dynamics. Be-
lot’s argument relies on the existence of a canonical isomorphism between the fully
reduced phase space and a space of diffeomorphism invariant spacetimes defined via
the covariant formalism – we shall therefore dub it the isomorphism argument.
Consider a system that does not display any gauge freedom. It’s dynamics can
be described in terms of a space of solutions to the Euler–Lagrange equations, S, or
in terms of set of curves in a phase space, I, with the usual symplectic structure.
Although there exists an isomorphism between points in these two spaces, they have
distinct representational roles – a point in γ ∈ S represents an entire history of our
system, while a point in I represents an instantaneous state of the system. According
to Belot, ‘this distinction is grounded by the fact that relative to a slicing one finds
that for each t ∈ R, the map that sends a solution to the initial data that it induces on
the instant Σt, defines a distinct isomorphism between the space of solutions and the
space of initial data.’ And thus ‘it is natural to think of points of the latter space as
representing states that can occur at distinct times and to think of points in the space
of solutions as representing possible worlds composed out of such states.’ If under this
interpretation the system is taken to be the whole universe, then clearly points in I
should be considered as representing distinct instantaneous states of the world, and
those in S should be considered as representing worlds composed out of such states.
Now, for a standard gauge theory without Hamiltonian constraints, such an inter-
pretation can no longer be justified in these terms. Rather than having a one-to-one
map that confers representative equivalence between each time slice of solution and a
point in phase space, for each slice of a given solution we have a one-to-many map,
with the target an entire gauge equivalence class of points in phase space. However, if
we pass to a reduced phase space IR via symplectic reduction, as well as constructing a
reduced solution space SR via an analogous reduction process (i.e., quotienting out the
action of the Lagrangian gauge group), then we recover our distinct isomorphism per
time slice and therefore also our argument towards the different representational roles
17See §3.3 of The´bault (2011) for an advanced geometric argument that further evidences the dy-
namical triviality of the reduced phase space of canonical general relativity.
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of the two spaces – the former for instants, the latter for entire worlds.
The case of general relativity – as an atypical gauge theory – is crucially differ-
ent. Because of the nature of the diffeomorphism group, points in the reduced space
of solutions cannot be individually decomposed into slices, and this means that only
a single isomorphism exists between diffeomorphic solution classes and points in the
reduced phase space. This, Belot argues, means ‘it is difficult to deny’ that we should
interpret them as representationally equivalent spaces. Thus, according to Belot the
reduced space is dynamically non-trivial since it can be taken to represent universes that
contain evolution and, furthermore, ‘we should resist any temptation to think of the
reduction procedure as telling us to think of an early state of the universe and a late
state of the universe as being the same instantaneous state’ – contrary to what we have
argued argued above.
Although innovative and to some extent insightful, the isomorphism argument of
Belot is problematic in a number of respects. Firstly, if read as a strong deductive
argument, Belot’s reasoning seems to rest on the non-sequitur that since the existence
of a distinct isomorphism per time slice gives us grounds to fix distinct representational
roles for IR and SR, the non-existence of such a family of isomorphisms implies that
the two spaces should be taken to be representatively equivalent. Completely besides
the nature of the mappings that exist between them, we have very good reasons for
asserting that solutions represent worlds and phase space points represent instants –
the variational basis upon which the two structures are defined and the different form of
the relevant boundary conditions to name just two. Just because in the case of general
relativity we no longer have access to one argument towards their representational in-
equivalence does not indicate that we no longer have any arguments available at all!
Furthermore, the existence of a single isomorphism between points in two represen-
tative spaces is far from a sufficient condition for them to play equivalent roles (although
it could in some cases be taken to be necessary) since we can trivially find such relation-
ships between manifestly inequivalent structures – two books with the same number
of words, for example. This means that even if we take the isomorphism argument as
motivating an interpretation rather than deducing a conclusion, there are good reasons
to doubt its strength: without reasons beyond the existence of the isomorphism, it is
not difficult to deny that the two space are representationally equivalent.
In fact, it makes far more sense for the representational role of a space within a theory
to be fixed primarily by its relationship to the representative structures from which it is
derived rather than to a space utilised in the context of a different formalism. For the
case of general relativity, therefore, it is more appropriate to consider the relationship
between the reduced phase space and the unreduced phase space as fixing the former’s
representational role.
In this context, one could argue that if we accept Belot’s interpretation of the
reduced space as a space of histories, then we should think ourself forced into also
asserting that points in the unreduced space are also representative of four-dimensional
histories, and this is manifestly inconsistent with the ADM procedure that leads to the
construction of this space. Rather, since we know by definition that a point in the
18
unreduced phase space corresponds to a three metric and its canonical momentum, we
should take points in the unreduced space to represent instantaneous states and curves
in this space to represent entire four-dimensional histories. By passing to a quotient
of this space, we are classifying sets of points as equivalent and so representatively
speaking we are classifying groups of instantaneous states as equivalent. To be consistent
with both the representative role of the space from which it is constructed and the
manner of its construction, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the reduced phase
space should be interpreted as representing instantaneous states – and therefore that
our charge of dynamical triviality against reductive temporal relationalism cannot be
avoided.
In any case, as discussed at great length in §2.3, the nature of the Hamiltonian
constraint is precisely such that we should expect any procedure which treats them
as typical, gauge generating constraints to lead to a formalism without nontrivial dy-
namical evolution. Thus our argument towards fixing the representational roles in the
manner described is supplementary rather than fundamental to our conclusion that
dynamic trivialisation is implied by reductive temporal relationalism.
In this section we have argued that reductive temporal relationalism and the form
of denial of time that it implies is an at best problematic and at worst fatally flawed
position. Evidence has been provided that it leads to an interpretation of the formalism
of canonical general relativity that is not adequate as a representative framework for
describing the world since it admits only static universes. The crucial question is now
which aspects of the interpretation are responsible for driving us into such a conceptual
cul-de-sac? Was it the temporal relationalism or the reductionism that was the cause of
the problem? In the next section, we will investigate a different conception of temporal
relationalism, in part with the object of settling this matter.
4. Denial II: Machian temporal relationalism
4.1. Machian dynamics and the Hamiltonian constraints
A second, and quite different, perspective on time within general relativity is en-
abled by the Machian temporal relationalism of Barbour (1995, 1994, 2000, 2009). The
principal element of this form of relationalism with regard to time is not an objec-
tion to temporal points forming part of our basic ontology, nor even the assertion of a
Leibnizian equivalence principle such that any universes related by temporal symme-
tries must be judged to not constitute distinct possibilities – although consistency with
these other relationalist dictates is implicit. Rather for Barbour the fundamental edict
of temporal relationalism is that time should be ‘an abstraction, at which we arrive by
means of the changes of things; made because we are not restricted to any one definite
measure, all being interconnected’ (Mach (1960)). This Machian viewpoint on time can
be seen as an imperative to try to construct (or at least restructure) our theories in
such a way that time (in the sense of an external measure of duration) does not appear
within the basic structure of the theory but is a well defined notion at a derived or
emergent concept level. Thus, as well as a position as to what time is not, the Machian
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variant of relationalism is a position as to what time is. Particularly, important to both
Barbour’s interpretation of Mach (which he shares with Mittelstaedt (1976)) and his
own philosophy, is that the relational definition of time is a holistic and democratic one
based upon contributions from all the motions within the universe.18
We will take this to mean that a theory, or interpretation of a theory, that is
temporally relational in a Machian sense should provide us with a distinct definition of
time for any dynamical history of the universe.
Let us make our conception of Machian temporal relationalism a little more precise.
In the introduction we characterised our enquiry into the three ‘denials of time’ in
terms of the extent to which the various interpretations weaken the ‘typical’ temporal
structure of the theory. By this we meant both mathematical features, such as one-
dimensionally, metricity, topological structure and point type structure, as well as the
more physical features, such as non-trivial dynamical change and ordering of distinct
instantaneous spatial configurations. In our initial discussion of reductive relationalism
in §3.2 we considered the idea of removing the temporal point structure as one notion
of such a temporal weakening. Machian temporal relationalism is predicated upon
dispensing with/avoiding a different (although closely connected) aspect of temporal
structure. It is the the metrical structure of time that is argued to be non-fundamental
– although it is required to be derivable based upon relative change between spatial
configurations. Fundamentally, to cohere with the Machian view a theory must not
be predicated upon more than an ordered, one dimensional sequence of spatial states
and yet (as indicated above) must also allow for a unique and equitable measure of
duration to emerge from the dynamics. It is a form of relationalism because it is the
intrinsic relations between the individual spatial configurations that is taken to define
the temporal metric.
Although it clearly starts from a different perspective, there is a degree of coherence
between this form of temporal relationalism and that predicated upon the denial of
temporal points discussed above. There is no room within the ontology of a Machian
theory for any basic temporal points or time labelling since to endorse such structure
would be to add external temporal structure beyond an ordering of spatial states.
Furthermore, it also seems safe to presume that the democratic nature of the process
by which time is abstracted will be such that universes related by temporal symmetries
must bear the same emergent notion of temporality. We can therefore expect that even
at the level of an abstracted concept of time a Leibnizian equivalence principle should
be satisfied.
So much for what it means to be a Machian temporal relationalist in principle. In
practice, a formal basis sufficient to establish such a position can easily be achieved
18There is an added subtly, glossed over here and below, with regard to the constitution of this
dynamic democracy: as pointed out by Anderson (2011) one will invariably derive a more accurate
Machian notion of time by treating some changes as more equal than others – and so there is a further
distinction that could be made between a more practical and accurate ‘meritocratic’ Machianism’, and
an impractical and inaccurate ‘egalitarian’ Machianism.
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within non-relativistic mechanics by switching to the formalism of the Jacobi theory of
mechanics (see (Lanczos, 1970, §5) for an excellent introduction). Following Barbour
and Foster (2008) (see also The´bault (2012)), the Jacobi Hamiltonian takes the form
HJ =
∑
i
pi.q˙i − LJ = NJhJ (13)
where we define the Jacobi Hamiltonian constraint as
hJ =
1
2
∑
i
pi.pi + V − E = 0 (14)
and the lapse is an arbitrary function of of the time label τ . The form of these equations
is very suggestive of the canonical formulation of general relativity introduced above.
We have a Hamiltonian constraint that is connected with arbitrariness in temporal
labelling, and we a Hamiltonian that is made up only of a constraint and an arbitrary
multiplier. What is particularly important for our purposes is how we should interpret
the action of the Jacobi Hamiltonian constraint upon phase space. Explicitly we have
that (provided the constraint is satisfied)
NJ{qi, hJ} = δqi
δτ
(15)
which indicates that, for any specification of the Jacobi lapse, the Jacobi Hamiltonian
will effect an infinitesimal phase space transformation from the canonical variables char-
acterising a given instant in time to those describing a second instant that is dynamically
subsequent.
This is in close analogy to the dynamical role of the Hamiltonian constraints of
canonical general relativity. However, as in the relativistic case, this Poisson bracket also
encodes a symmetry generating role in that, strictly speaking, the transformation that
hJ generates is unphysical because of the dependence on the arbitrary parameterisation
encoded in the lapse. Thus again we have evolution enacted by a constraint and thus
our dynamics and our temporal symmetry are entangled. In the case of the Jacobi
theory, there is a straightforward methodology for disentangling them in the context
of Machian temporal relationalism. As mentioned above, as well as the preclusion
of external temporal parameters within our mechanical theory, the Machian temporal
relationalist position involves a positive idea of time as an equitable measure that can be
abstracted from dynamics. The Jacobi theory admits exactly this notion of temporality
because we may naturally specify an emergent temporal increment:
δt =
√
T
(E − V )δτ =
√
δqi.δqi
2(E − V ) (16)
In Lagrangian terms this quantity can be understood as a form of ephemeris time
(since it is connected to the astronomical concept of the same name), and is introduced
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by choosing τ such that T = E − V . In what follows we will simply refer to it as
the ephemeris time. This then leads us to express the emergent temporal increment as
δt = NJδτ , and therefore identify the Hamiltonian lapse with
√
T
(E−V ) .
19 The ephemeris
time is such that it uniquely and monotonically parameterises dynamical histories, and
yet is still invariant under arbitrary rescalings of τ . It is holistic and democratic in
exactly the sense that Barbour desires because it involves all20 the dynamical variables
of a given system – crucially it is a measure of duration that ‘emerges from the dynamics’
and ‘does not pre-exist in the kinematics’ (Barbour (1994, p.2856)).
We can take the Hamiltonian formulation of the Jacobi theory as a model for the
Hamiltonian formulation of any Machian temporally relational theory. In particular,
it suggests a set of four criteria for the formal structure of such a theory: 1) the
parameterisation of phase space curves is arbitrary; 2) the canonical variables do not
contain external time variables or their momenta; 3) there is a Hamiltonian constraint
that has a dynamical phase space action when combined with an arbitrary multiplier;
4) there exists a methodology for constructing an emergent temporal increment that
parameterises dynamical histories in an equitable and unique manner.
If 1-4 are satisfied, then it seems reasonable to accept that the theory admits an
interpretation consistent with Machian temporal relationalism. As discussed above,
such an interpretation has two key features: i) A basic ontology that contains no
more temporal structure than a ordered one dimensional sequence of spatial states
(in particular no external temporal metric or time variable); and ii) Our ability to
abstract an equitable measure of duration from the change (or relative change) of the
spatial states that make up the ontology. Specifically, it seems reasonable to assume
that 1-2 lead to i) since they ensure that sequences of points within the phase space
can be understood as representing the fundamental ontology of ordered spatial states
without reference to an external temporal metric or time variable. We then have that
3-4 lead to ii) since, as illustrated by the case of the Jacobi theory, they give us the
machinery to associate the appropriate temporal increment with pairs of points in the
phase space (elements of the ontology). The utility of our criteria (which are of a
heuristic rather than logical character) is illustrated by their preclusion of a Machian
temporal relationalist interpretation of parameterised particle mechanics (there 2 does
not hold) and admission of such an interpretation for Barbour–Bertotti theory (Barbour
and Bertotti (1982)) (where 1-4 all hold).
Given these criteria, we can now address the task of evaluating the interpretation
of canonical general relativity in terms of Machian temporal relationalism (MTR).21
19Thanks to Julian Barbour for clarifying this point to me.
20See footnote 18 above for an important qualification to the ‘all’ in this context
21It must be noted here that much of Barbour’s work on the Machian temporal structure of general
relativity focuses on general relativity formulated in Lagrangian terms. Our focus on the canonical
formalism will not obscure the essential aspects since they are inherent within the dynamical structure
of general relativity and therefore beyond the Lagrangian/Hamiltonian distinction. See Pooley (2001)
and Butterfield (2002) for detailed philosophical analysis using, for the most part, Barbour’s version
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Considering the form of the ADM action that was introduced in (3) above,
S =
1
κ
∫
R
dt
∫
σ
d3x{q˙abP ab − [NaHa + |N |H]} (17)
This action is invariant under rescallings of the time parameter t and is based upon
canonical variables (qab and P
ab) that are purely spatial. Thus temporal structure does
not occur within the basic formalism of the theory in precisely the senses 1) and 2)
described above, and we have that aspect i) of MTR may be taken to hold in canonical
general relativity.
To an extent, we also have that the third condition holds because the Hamiltonian
is of course a constraint and in one context its role is (when combined with the lapse)
to generate a transition between dynamically related three geometries. However, as has
been asserted throughout our discussion it is essential to remember that Hamiltonian
constraints of canonical gravity have a dual nature with two distinct, context-dependent
roles. In the context of a hypersurface embedded within a solution, the role of the
Hamiltonian constraints is not of the predominately dynamical type found in the Jacobi
theory. Rather, they generate infinitesimal symmetry transformations that form part
of the hypersurface deformation group, BK (see discussion of §2.2), which manifests
the fundamental symmetry of the theory. Still, this does not necessarily break the
analogy between the relativistic and non-relativistic Hamiltonian constraints since in
the Jacobi theory too the Hamiltonian constraint is also connected with unphysical
temporal re-labellings. However, the fact that the temporal re-labellings associated
with the infinite set of Hamiltonian constraints of canonical relativity are local and
those associated with the single Hamiltonian constraint of the Jacobi theory are global
is of crucial importance. Ultimately, the disanalogy that this subtle yet significant
difference implies creates an acute problem for an interpretation of canonical general
relativity in Machian temporally relational terms.
The fourth criterion that we introduced for the formal structure of MTR Hamilto-
nian theory was that we are able to construct an emergent temporal increment that
parameterises dynamical histories in an equitable and unique manner. Given this to-
gether with the third criterion, it seems reasonable to presume that we can interpret
the phase space of our theory to represent a Machian ontology in the sense of being
amenable to the condition ii) above. More explicitly: if our theory is such that two
distinct points in phase space that are dynamically related can be connected by the
application of the Hamiltonian constraints times suitable multipliers and, furthermore,
the difference between them is parameterised uniquely by an emergent time parameter,
then we may interpret each point in the phase space as representing the state of the
objects in the world and the change between these two distinct ontological states as en-
coding uniquely a measure of duration in terms of ontological change. In the case of the
canonical Jacobi theory, we were able to satisfy this criterion through the employment
of the Lagrangian formalism.
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of ephemeris time, and it is therefore natural to look to construct a similar emergent
temporal increment to enable a Machian reading of canonical general relativity.
As has already been mentioned, the crucial difference between the two theories is
that the single, global Hamiltonian constraint of the Jacobi theory becomes an infinite
set of local Hamiltonian constraints in general relativity. Thus, rather than looking for
a single global ephemeris time it is natural to look for many local ephemeris times. A
point in the phase space of canonical general relativity corresponds to canonical data
on a spacelike hypersurface σ. The locality of the ephemeris times is necessitated by
the fact that we need one such time for every x ∈ σ. The lapse is of course itself a local
function (the dependence on x is suppressed in the notation above). Thus, by looking
for formulation of the theory with a lapse such that it defines the desired emergent
temporal increment when multiplied by an infinitesimal change in the time parameter
we can define our local ephemeris times. If we denote the lapse of such a formulation
Neph(x), then the local ephemeris can be written simply as Neph(x)δt, where t is of
course now playing the part of the arbitrary time parameter.
The crucial problem is then finding a formulation of the theory containing a local
ephemeris with the desired properties. In particular, as well as being insensitive to
rescalings of the time parameter, we need our local ephemeris time to be such that
it will replicate time as measured by local clocks and thus be consistent with proper
time. Furthermore, it is also fundamental to the notion of Machian temporality that
any given local ephemeris time be an equitable measure of duration, and therefore that
it takes account of the contribution of all the other degrees of freedom – even those
that are non-locally separated from the spatial point at which it is defined.
Interestingly, according to Barbour (2000) the ‘deep structure’ of general relativity
already contains exactly the type of local ephemeris time that we are looking for.22
Starting with the BSW (Baierlein, Sharp, and Wheeler (1962)) reformulation of co-
variant general relativity one can derive (Barbour, Foster, and o´ Murchadha, 2002,
pp.10-12) an expression for the lapse that, within a Lagrangian picture, takes the form
NBSW =
√
T/4R where T is a ‘kinetic energy’ term (Barbour et al., 2002, (4.2)). If the
time label t within T is chosen such that NBSW = 1 then t will correspond to a proper
time. Furthermore, for arbitrary time label NBSW (x)δt will always be equal to the local
proper time. Just as in the case of the Jacobi theory we can translate this Lagrangian
emergent time framework into the a Hamiltonian analogue. There NBSW (x)δt gives
us an emergent notion of duration that is equal to the local proper time calculated
along the direction perpendicular to Σt and is non-locally dependent upon the entire
three-metric and its canonical momentum. Thus, local ephemeris time is a consistent
notion within canonical general relativity (given the BSW formulation).
Furthermore, after the introduction of local ephemeris time we are able to classify
pairs of points within dynamically successive (infinitesimally close) three-geometries as
carrying a trans-temporal notion of identity. Such points are said to be equilocal, and
22Note: he does not use the phrase ‘deep structure’ in this quite this context!
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the ephemeris time marks them out in terms of the unique temporal metric it provides.
For our purposes, the crucial point is that the temporal metric that ephemeris time
gives us is defined to be independent of arbitrary reparameterisations of the temporal
parameter (t in the case of canonical general relativity) and thus allows us to parame-
terise dynamical trajectories in phase space in exactly the manner required for criterion
4.
We thus have that 1-4 hold and would then expect canonical general relativity to
admit a consistent interpretation in terms of Machian temporal relationalism. However,
there is an acute problem with the Machian interpretation resulting, as foreshadowed
above, from the locality of the Hamiltonian constraints. The necessary arbitrariness
within the definition of NBSW (x) entails that, given initial canonical data on a three
geometry, the dynamical evolution generated by H(NBSW ) does not provide us with a
unique continuation. This is the result of the Hamiltonian’s second role of generating in-
finitesimal diffeomorphisms when considered in the context of hypersurfaces embedded
in dynamical spacetimes, and leads to an acute problem of seeming indeterminism.
Consider two dynamical spacetimes that are part of the same four-dimensional dif-
feomorphism equivalence class. In canonical terms these spacetimes are represented by
a pair of curves within the constraint surface in phase space. Let us assume that these
curves are identical up to a given phase space point corresponding to canonical data
on σ0, and thereafter differ only in virtue of a different choice of the lapse – i.e. evo-
lution generated by H(N ′BSW ) rather than H(N
′′
BSW ). We should then consider them
as only differing by a local temporal re-labelling, which (in spacetime terms) can be
interpreted as an infinitesimal diffeomorphism of an embedded hypersurface. Given any
point x ∈ σ0, there will be an equilocal point within the subsequent three-geometries,
σ′ and σ′′, associated with each of the distinct phase space curves. The Machian notion
of ontology implies that these two initially equivalent curves should be thought of as
representing distinct possible histories of the universe, but provides us with no basis
to privilege one over the other once they diverge. Thus, we run into exactly the prob-
lematic indeterminism discussed in §4.2. This problem does not occur in the Jacobi
theory because the arbitrariness that remains within the lapse in that case only gains
effect through a single global Hamiltonian constraint and thus cannot lead to distinct
phase space curves. Thus, it seems that although an interpretation of canonical gen-
eral relativity in terms of Machian temporal relationalism can be achieved, this can
be done only at the price of admitting ontological indeterminism into a theory that is
manifestly deterministic in an empirical and, so far as the conventional interpretation
of the covariant formulation goes, formal sense.23
4.2. Sophisticated temporal relationalism and indeterminism
Our discussion of §3.1 highlighted the concern that by treating points in the unre-
duced phase space of a gauge theory as representative of individual states we leave
23In this respect at least our analysis of the Machian viewpoint precisely mirrors that made by
Pooley (2001) in the context of the Lagrangian formalism.
25
ourselves susceptible to a pernicious form of formal indeterminism within a physically
deterministic theory. It should be no surprise therefore that, as we have defined it by
the criteria 1-4, the Machian temporal relationalist approach to towards the Hamilto-
nian constraints and phase space of canonical general relativity leads to a specific case
of exactly this kind of problem. In our earlier discussion we focused upon symplectic
reduction as the supposed remedy for this indeterminism but found that in the case
of canonical general relativity such a procedure has a trivialising effect. We are thus
in need of an alternative, non-reductive methodology for dealing with indeterminism
within ontology.
Exactly such a methodology is potentially provided by the philosophical doctrine
of anti-haecceitism. Following Lewis (1983, p.19)), we can define an anti-haecceitist as
someone who denies that there can be ‘nonqualitative determinants of cross-identification’
between entities or objects in distinct worlds or structures. To adopt such a position
is to deny the possibility of real differences that are only with respect to which objects
play which role within the structure.
We can then considered a strategy for avoiding indeterminism within phase space by
identifying gauge related paths as providing representations of the same fundamental
history. This identification is made on the basis that the difference between the histories
– when seen as a sequence of ‘objects’ (i.e., instantaneous states) – is merely as to which
objects play which roles. If the inflation of possibilities entailed by such haecceitistic
differences between distinct histories are discounted – and we therefore adopt a position
of histories anti-Haecceitism – then any two histories which are gauge related in phase
space can be seen as corresponding to a single underlying ontology, and the spectre of
pernicious ontological indeterminism vanishes.
An immediate question is then whether adoption of some version of histories anti-
Haecceitism can be applied within the context of canonical general relativity, with the
object of reliving temporal relationalism of indeterminism. Let us label the combina-
tion of histories anti-Haecceitism with relationalism about time as sophisticated tem-
poral relationalism (STR). Essentially, a sophisticated temporal relationalist is going
to deny the reality of local temporal labellings and endorse the notion that space-
times related by local re-labellings (i.e., re-foliations) are multiply realised in terms
of sequences of objects (instantaneous states) that differ merely as to which roles are
being played by which objects. In the canonical context, this equates to treating phase
space curves that are equivalent to re-foliations of the same spacetime as representing
the same fundamental ontology. This is not equivalent to treating the phase space
action of the Hamiltonian constraints as generating gauge equivalence classes – such
a position is, as we have seen, problematic and manifestly distinct from both the re-
lationalist/substantivalist and (histories) haecceitist/anti-haecceitist disjuncts. Rather
our sophisticated temporal relationalist, unlike the reductive temporal relationalist, can
account for the dual role of the Hamiltonian constraints by, on the one hand, treating
the curves it generates in phase space as dynamics and, on the other, by classifying two
such curves that are related purely by the deformation of a constituent three-geometry
as representing the same basic history realised in terms of two structures that differ
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merely haecceitistically.
It is very important to note that the identification between the same objects ‘playing
different roles’ that grounds the claim that the relevant structures differ ‘merely haeccei-
tistically’ – relies on our ability to consider a pair of three-geometries within space-times
related by a re-foliation as being the same object. We thus require a formalism which
provides a ‘point-by-point’ identification between each of the constituent ‘objects’ for
STR to be a viable position. As was made clear by the analysis of above, such an
understanding of re-foliation symmetry cannot be provided at the level of phase space.
Rather, it is only at the level of hyper-surfaces embedded within a spacetime that we
can be the necessary identifications – specifically in terms of the action of an element of
the hyper-surface deformation group (Teitelboim (1973), Hojman et al. (1976)). In that
context (or alternatively by using the closely related formalism of Isham and Kucharˇ
(1985)), we can construct a well defined notion of histories anti-Haecceitism since we
can properly define the haecceitistic differences which we which to deny. Thus, our
ability to avoid ontological indeterminism within phase space is built upon our ability
to define the relevant temporal relationalist ontology within an enlarged space including
embedding variables and therefore inevitably some notion of spacetime.
This last and crucial point makes it clear that the kind of sophisticated temporal
relationalist position which we have outlined is going to make an uncomfortable bed-
fellow for the Machian notion of relationalism. STR as we have defined it essentially
makes use of an ontology predicated upon four-dimensional spacetimes and not merely
sequences of three-geometries. The relevant inter-structure identification between ob-
jects can only be properly defined in the spacetime context. Thus, we violate the key
MTR notion that time (or spacetime) should not form part of the basic ontological
structure. STR does allow for a viable notion of relationalism (to the extent of allowing
us to exclude temporal points) and would seem to be compatible with the emergent
notion of time that forms the other key aspect of the Machian position. However, it is
essentially a spacetime theory of temporal relationalism and thus cannot be construed
as Machian in the most fundamental sense.24
4.3. Scale invariance and Machian temporal relationalism
We thus return to the dilemma of extricating the Machian temporal relationalist
philosophy from the ontological indeterminism issue. As was mentioned above, the root
of the problem lies within the local nature of ephemeris time and this in turn is due to
foliation invariance. It is therefore fairly obvious that a solution could lie within the fix-
ing of a foliation and with, therefore, a Machian temporally relationalist interpretation
of canonical general relativity in a preferred foliation. Three issues with such a strategy
24Here we should note a connection between our conclusions, made in a canonical context, and those
of Pooley (2001). Although the characterisation given here is different in some notable respects, our
STR position is clearly closely related to the ‘rather subtle and nebulous form of Machianism’ that
he defines in terms of a position where one ‘regard[s] a spacetime as genuinely constructed from all
possible compatible sequences of 3-geometries’ (p.17).
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are immediately apparent. First, there must be a basis for this preferred foliation that
is, at the very least non-ad hoc, and preferably driven by Machian underpinnings. Sec-
ond, if we are to exclude large sectors of the traditional (canonical) solution space by
fixing a foliation, then those solutions excluded must be at the very least not empirically
grounded, and preferably not empirically viable. Third, the foliation-fixed version of
canonical GR must still be consistent with the Machian criteria 1-4 introduced above.
Recent years have in fact seen dramatic improvements for the provision of good an-
swers to all three of these points through the development of a scale invariant approach
to Machian general relativity know as shape dynamics. We do not have space here to
give a detailed introduction to or description of this programme and its recent devel-
opments. We can at least, however, give a basic outline of its key elements such that
we can consider shape dynamics in the context of the three points regarding foliation
fixed canonical GR and MTR just raised.
As a philosophical and methodological attitude taken towards physical theory, the
Machian approach is one that in general advocates the elimination of absolute or back-
ground structure. Modern Machians, Julian Barbour of course being most notable
amongst them, argue that whether in Newtonian mechanics or general relativity, such
structure should be cleaved from our representation of the world via the adoption of
alternative, appropriately minimal, theories of mechanics. In this sense, Machianism
can be seen as a general scheme for eliminating absolute structure, minimising initial
data, and a description of the world based in some sense on relations. This general
programme should not be conflated with the specific projects of Machian temporal and
spatial relationalism. One would hope, however, that the two cohere – and with regard
to absolute structure relating to scale and time so it appears to be the case.
There is within all the major theories of mechanics, including general relativity, an
absolute notion of scale – conformal transformations (i.e. those which preserve angles
but not lengths) are not symmetries at either the local or global level. Within covariant
general relativity, this means that solutions of the theory are not invariant under con-
formal transformations of spacetime. Attempts to construct a gravitational theory that
is 4D conformally invariant have a long history stretching back to Weyl (1918, 1922).
More pertinent to our project is the programme of constructing a 3D scale invariant
theory – i.e. one that is invariant under conformal transformations of space. The in-
vestigation of implementing such a symmetry within general relativity in fact parallels
the development of the canonical approach in that it can also be traced back to the late
nineteen-fifties and Dirac (1959). In both this work and its extension by York (1973),
we already have 3D conformal invariance explicitly connected to a gauge-fixed formu-
lation of general relativity with a preferred foliation. More, recently Gomes, Gryb,
and Koslowski (2011) have build on the work of Barbour and o´ Murchadha (2010) and
Anderson, Barbour, Foster, Kelleher, and o´ Murchadha (2005) to propose the existence
of a intrinsic duality between a theory invariant under volume preserving local 3D con-
formal transformations and general relativity. Specifically, the particular gauge fixing
of general relativity that corresponds to the foliation of spatially compact spacetimes
into space-like hypersurfaces of constant mean curvature (the CMC gauge) is taken to
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be equivalent to a particular gauge fixing of a ‘dual theory’ that describes sequences
of spatial three manifolds invariant under both three-dimensional diffeomorphisms and
3D (volume preserving) conformal transformations. Crudely and yet fairly accurately
put, the essence of this shape dynamics programme is then to exchange the foliation
symmetry which is present in GR for the local conformal symmetry which is absent.
Thus, we can provide a reasoned and, what is more, Machian basis for fixing a foliation.
Our second concern above was that since fixing a foliation amounts to a restriction
to a particular sector of the solution space of general relativity there is a danger that
it might have undesirable consequences with regard to the empirical adequacy and/or
predictive power of the theory. This concern is directly analogous to that discussed in
§4.2 regarding the restriction to globally hyperbolic solutions that is entailed by moving
to the canonical formalism. In essence, so far as it relates to canonical general relativity,
the shape dynamics approach amounts to the introduction of the restriction that as well
as being globally hyperbolic solutions must be CMC foliable. According to Gomes et al.
(2011) this is a weak restriction since it ‘includes the vast majority of physically inter-
esting solutions to Einstein’s equations while excluding many physically uninteresting
solutions’. Thus, one may be able to argue that empirically nothing has been lost – cer-
tainly we are able to retain the solutions most relevant to currently observed empirical
phenomena since the Schwarzschild, FRW, Reissner-Nordstro¨m and Kerr-Newman so-
lutions are all CMC foliable.25 Furthermore, as was argued above for canonical general
relativity and the hyperbolic solution case, we are not invoking an ad-hoc philosophical
principle in order to exclude these solutions but rather a theory derived from definite
physical principles (in this case 3D scale invariance). A more forceful response to this
worry is to convert this supposed empirical deficiency into a prediction. Since the re-
striction to CMC foliable spacetimes can be seen as a consequence of shape dynamics,
we may argue that it is providing us with a falsifiable statement about the world that
goes beyond those provided by conventional general relativity. Additionally, it also in a
sense offers us an explanation why our universe does not manifest phenomena relevant
to non-CMC foliable solutions – if they are nomologically possible, why do we not find
them or approximations to them in nature? Admittedly, as independent arguments for
preferring shape dynamics over traditional general relativity these are not altogether
convincing lines of reasoning, but their adoption certainly seems enough to blunt any
criticism of the approach along the same lines.
Our third, and most important, worry concerning foliation fixing and MTR is
whether general relativity, so formulated, still has the necessary characteristics 1-4
that were deemed necessary for a theory to be susceptible to the relevant Machian re-
lational interpretation of temporality. To investigate this point in the context of shape
dynamics we must consider the latter in a little more technical detail. The methodology
for constructing the scale invariant ‘dual theory’ that Gomes et al. (2011) employ can
25At least so long as we exclude the areas within the event horizon of black hole solutions. For the
relevant, very general, existence proof see o´ Murchadha and York (1973). For issues with regard to
uniqueness see Gomes (2012).
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be broken down into five distinct stages. We will briefly outline these in order to argue
that the resulting theory can be understood in terms of the notion of Machian temporal
relationalism that we have introduced.
The first step is to explicitly identify the requisite symmetry that will be exchanged
for foliation invariance. This is the quotient group denoted by C/V . Here C is the
(Abelian) group of conformal transformations on the (assumed to be compact) spatial
three manifold, which in our notation is σ. The elements of this group are scalars
φ : σ → R which are such that:
qab(x)→ e4φxqab(x) (18)
Pab(x)→ e−4φxPab(x) (19)
V is then a one parameter sub-group representing homogenous conformal transforma-
tions. The explicit construction of C/V in terms of equivalence classes of conformal
transformations [φ] then enforces that there exists a unique representative which leaves
the three volume Vq =
∫
σ
d3x
√|q|(x) invariant (see Eq. 61 and the surrounding discus-
sion of Gomes et al. (2011) for details). This then allows us to parameterise the group
C/V by scalars associated with volume preserving conformal transformations and thus
indicates that we have identified the appropriate symmetry group. The next step is to
formally adjoin this symmetry to the theory. Glossing over the technicalities of exactly
how this is done (see Gomes et al. (2011, §4.1.2)), we can understand this stage in terms
of an extension of the phase space of canonical general relativity through the introduc-
tion of additional canonical variables (the Stu¨ckelberg field and its conjugate momenta),
which in turn, due to dynamical consistency requirements, results in the presence of
an additional set of first class constraints C(x) = 0. Like the Hamiltonian constraints,
there is one of these constraints per spatial point. However, unlike the Hamiltonian con-
straints the C(x) can be straightforwardly understood as generating unphysical gauge
transformations (akin to the transformations generated by the momentum constraints)
– these are the volume preserving conformal transformations. Importantly, because
of the fact that they are volume preserving, one of the new constraints reduces to an
identity, so in fact there is one conformal constraint less then there are Hamiltonian
constraints. The third step is to impose a gauge fixing via a best matching procedure
(see Gomes et al. (2011, §4.1.3) and references therein) such that all but one of the
original Hamiltonian constraints becomes second class (in the sense of the standard
Dirac (1964) terminology). The usual dynamical consistency conditions of the Dirac
prescription for dealing with second class constraints leads to a particular fixing of the
lapse up to a one parameter freedom. This lapse fixing is precisely that which gives the
equivalence class of CMC foliations. Still following the Dirac procedure, it is possible
to eliminate the second class constraints (Gomes et al. (2011, §4.1.4)) and arrive at a
theory with a Hamiltonian that is constituted by the sum of three distinct types of first
class constraint combined with the appropriate multipliers.
This new theory is shape dynamics, and its relationship with canonical general
relativity is such that for a specific gauge fixing it is equivalent to canonical general
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relativity in the CMC gauge. Like canonical general relativity, both the symmetry and
dynamical properties of the theory are encoded within the structure of the different
types of constraints. The first of these constraints are the conformal constraints, which
are responsible for the theory’s invariance under volume preserving conformal transfor-
mations. Next are momentum constraints, which although they have been transformed
in the passage to the new phase space can still be understood as implementing three-
dimensional diffeomorphism invariance as in the original theory. Finally, and most
important for our purposes, there is a single Hamiltonian constraint. This constraint is
exactly analogous to the single Hamiltonian constraint of the Jacobi theory: it gener-
ates dynamics when considered as acting on phase space and global reparameterisations
when considered as acting on an entire solution.
Let us now consider our four criteria for a theory to be susceptible to an inter-
pretation in terms of Machian temporal relationalism. Within the dual theory, the
parameterisation of phase space curves is arbitrary (i.e. 1), and furthermore the canon-
ical variables do not contain external time variables or their momenta (i.e. 2). We can
also now see that, since there is a Hamiltonian constraint that has a dynamical phase
space action when combined with an arbitrary multiplier, we also have 3. Thus the
condition for an interpretation in terms of MTR is that there exists a methodology for
constructing an emergent temporal increment that parameterises dynamical histories in
a equitable and unique manner (i.e. 4). Since we have a single Hamiltonian constraint
that is combined with a special lapse with a one parameter freedom, intuitively it seems
that the construction of the requisite notion of global ephemeris time should be possible
within the dual theory itself. However, sidestepping the interesting technical challenge
of explicitly constructing such an object, we can, because of the duality between the
theories, consider instead the parallel issue within CMC foliated canonical general rel-
ativity. Here it transpires our problem is in fact effectively already solved since it has
long been know that all spacetimes admitting a CMC foliation can be parameterised
by a unique geometric time (See Belot (2007, §7.3) for discussion of the details). Since
it is determined by the difference in intrinsic curvature between slices in a dynamical
solution this geometric time is both unique and suitably equitable. Thus, almost by
definition, canonical general relativity in the CMC gauge satisfies our condition 4. We
can therefore assert that both this form of general relativity and the dual theory are
amenable to an interpretation in terms of MTR, crucially without any problems relating
to indeterminism. 26
26Once more there is a close connection between our conclusions and those of Pooley (2001). In
essence, his conclusion that the then embryonic 3D conformal theory of Barbour and o´ Murchadha
(1999) should lead to a solution of Machian indeterminism problem is entirely endorsed by the under-
standing of shape dynamics which we have presented.
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5. Denial III: Complete Observables and The Parmenidean State
We now turn to our third denial of time which is based upon Rovelli’s complete and
partial observable scheme (Rovelli (1990, 1991, 2002b, 2004)) as applied to canonical
general relativity within the work of Dittrich (2006, 2007) and Thiemann (2007). The
notion of temporality that is implied by this scheme could be conflated with our first
denial in term reductive temporal relationalism. However, as we shall see, despite some
superficial similarity with regard to how the Hamiltonian constraints are treated there
are in fact deep conceptual differences. In particular, whereas reductive relational-
ism is predicated upon the reduced phase space, the Rovelli-Dittrich-Thiemann (RDT)
approach is unequivocally non-reductive. Furthermore, whereas reductive temporal re-
lationalism, and for that matter relationalism in general, is fundamentally a thesis with
regard to the priority of relational over purely temporal structure, the RDT approach
can only naturally be interpreted in terms of a philosophical framework which precludes
temporal structure altogether. We will begin our discussion of this third denial by first
introducing the RDT scheme in the context of the simple non-relativistic case of the
Jacobi theory introduced above.
5.1. The Complete and Partial Observables Ansatz
Consider the physical phase space of Jacob’s theory, ΓJ = {(p, q) ∈ ΠJ |H(p, q)J =
0}, which is a sub-manifold within the extended phase space defined by the satisfaction
of the constraint. According to standard Dirac machinery for dealing with constrained
Hamiltonian theories we define as the observables the class of functions on this physical
phase space which have vanishing Poisson bracket with the constraints. With the weak
inequality implying restriction to the constraint surface, we can write this as a condi-
tion of a general extended phase space function f : ΓJ → R as {f,HJ} ≈ 0. Like with
reduction with respect to Hamiltonian constraints in general relativity the application
of this standard definition has immediate, and problematic, consequences for our de-
scription of change. If the observable functions must commute with the Hamiltonian
then they must also be non-changing along dynamical trajectories. It seems that either:
i) this definition of observable; or ii) our expectations for the notion of change that our
theory provides us, must be adapted to deal with theories in which the Hamiltonian
is a constraint. The essence of the RDT, both as it applies to the Jacobi theory and
general relativity, is to assert that the problem lies within ii). With some ingenuity we
can construct observable functions with non-trivial representational capacity so along
as we abandon the notion that these obervables change in any conventional sense. The
proposal for constructing such obervables is what we shall call the complete and partial
obervables non-relativistic and we shall introduce it here first in terms of the Dittrich
(2007) non-relativistic treatment.
First let us label the configuration variables within phase space partial observables
and the designate the specification of relations between these variables complete observ-
ables. The latter are constituted within the Jacobi theory by the reparameterisation
invariant specification of the value of one configuration variable with respect to an-
other – as correlations between partial observables. The complete observables are the
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families of correlation functions which individually give the value of one of the partial
observables when the other (the clock variable) is equal to some real number.
There is some debate as to how we should interpret the partial observables. In
some of his later treatments Rovelli seems to imply that they can be considered to
have some independent physical reality – they are ‘the quantities with the most direct
physical interpretation in the theory’ (Rovelli, 2002b, p.124013-7) and, moreover, ‘we
can associate [them with] a (measuring) procedure leading to a number’ (p.124013-2).
However, the viability of this interpretation has contested by both Thiemann (2007, p.
78) and Rickles (2008, pp.154-68) principally on the grounds that it is difficult to see how
such quantities could be understood as physical magnitudes within a gauge invariant
framework. A particular problem is how we can understand a measurement of a single
partial observable as possible independent of anything else – surely it makes more sense
to view a measurement itself as a complete observables (i.e., a correlation between
the values of two quantities). Furthermore, by definition a theory cannot make any
predictions with regard to partial observables, so it seems difficult to motivate endowing
them with any empirical significance. In what follows we shall follow Thiemann, Rickles
and early Rovelli in holding that it should only be the complete observables that are
taken to be physically meaningful, and associated with possible measurements (see
Rovelli (2007) for further discussion of this point indicating that his current view seems
to be that although both approaches are consistent there are practical advantages to
the later position).
Consider a system described by two configuration variables (partial observables) q1
and q2 which together with their conjugate momenta obey a Hamiltonian constraint of
the form H[q1, q2, p1, p2] = 0. The phase space, (q1, q2, p1, p2) ∈ Γ, will as usual have a
symplectic structure. We can use the relevant symplectic form to define the action of
the Hamiltonian vector field on an arbitrary function, XH(f) = ω(Xf , XH) = {f,H}.
The flow, ατH , generated by this vector field can then be defined for every x ∈ Γ and we
can see this flow as acting on a phase space function, ατH(f)(x), such that it takes the
function along the solution.27 For our system therefore we calculate ατH(q1)(q1, q2, p1, p2)
and ατH(q2)(q1, q2, p1, p2) We then designate one of our variables as a clock variable and
seek to invert an expression of the form Tx(τ) = α
τ
H(q1)(x) such that solving Tx(τ) = s
for s ∈ R will give us an expression for τ in terms of s and q1.28 We can then insert
the inverted expression into the second flow equation ατH(q2)(x) by substituting for
τ , and produce an expression which gives us the value of q2 when q1 takes the value
s. This complete observable represents a family of functions (one for each s) each of
which expresses the correlation between our two partial observables without reference
to parameterisation.
Importantly, for a given dynamical solution, the conceptual leeway to consider a
27See Dittrich (2007, Eq. 2.5-7) for explicit formulas.
28In general this inversion will only be possible for a specific interval – thus the clock variables are
typically going to be at best locally well defined and so are unlikely to be continuous on phase space
and this means that the scheme will be difficult to implement in practice.
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family of these complete observables rather than a single correlation is dependent on
the use of the unreduced formalism. Thus, even though we are in a sense utilising the
standard Dirac condition for observable function we are not thereby committing to the
passage to the reduced phase space that is generally assume to go along with it – we are
only being consistent with Dirac observables scheme so far as it relates to the unreduced
phase space. This makes explicit the difference between this approach and reductive
relationalism. It also implies that unlike functions of the reduced phase space complete
observables have non-trivial representational capacity since within a given family of
observables we may represent the physical structure of a dynamical universe.
5.2. Application to General Relativity
Application of the complete and partial obervables Ansatz to canonical general
relativity poses a challenge of far greater difficulty for several reasons. We of course
have many constraints and in order to be a true complete observables the object we
construct must therefore be constant along the flow associated with all these. If all
the constraints were mutually Poisson commuting and finite in number this could be
addressed by the technically difficult, but conceptually fairly straight forward, process
of: i) introducing one clock variable per constraint; and ii) considering as our complete
observable a product between each of the flows generated by each of the constraints
when applied to a given partial observables, as evaluated for a specific value of each
of the relevant flow parameters. We would then have a family of complete observables
which were closely analogous to those consider above for the Jacobi theory, only they are
now constant along all the various gauge orbits. However, canonical general relativity
of course has an infinite number of constraints and, what is more, these constraints
do not Poisson commute. As pointed out by Thiemann (2007), even if we restrict our
selves to the space of spatially diffeomorphism-invariant functions (i.e. those satisfying
{ ~H( ~N), f} = 0) a flow which is associated with a given Hamiltonian constraints and
acts on such a function will not itself be spatially diffeomorphism-invariant since the
bracket { ~H( ~N), H(N)} = −κH(LNaN) is not invariant. Moreover, even if we remove
the momentum constraints altogether and presume ourselves to be working in super-
phase-space we still have to deal with the even more highly non-trivial Poisson bracket
between the Hamiltonian constraints which features structure functions. Thus, the
application of the basic RDT scheme outlined above to canonical general relativity
poses a significant challenge.
Encouragingly, a number of proposals for meeting this challenge have been put for-
ward. One is that of Dittrich (2006, 2007) which gives an explicit demonstration of
how complete observables for general relativity may be constructed in stages by first
computing partially compete observables which are complete observables with respect
to a sub-algebra of the constraints and then using these objects to to calculate complete
observables with respect to all the constraints. The partial observables in this construc-
tion are constituted by spacetime scalars which in turn are constructed out of canonical
fields, and this process serves to reduce the number of constraints that must be dealt
with. For reasons of space we will not here attempt a explanation of the details of the
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Dittrich approach but rather turn our attention to an alternative methodology know
as the master constraint programme. The choice between these two approaches is far
from a trivial one and particularly with regard to quantization it may have significant
technical implications. However, for our purposes it must be noted that in respect of the
interpretational implications with regard to time the fundamental features are common
to both methodologies and we are choosing to focus on the second only because it may
be introduced more concisely.
In general the idea of the master constraint programme (Thiemann (2006, 2007))
is to re-write constraint functions in terms of a single equation which will be satisfied
under the same conditions. This new single constraint is then the master constraint,
M, and it allows us to define a condition for observable functions within the phase
space through the equation:
{{M,O},O}|M=0 = 0 (20)
Strictly, this is a restriction that implies that the observable functions generate finite
symplectomorphisms which preserve Σ, rather than the usual Dirac condition that
the observables are constant along the null directions generated by the individual con-
straints. However, it can be demonstrated that the two conditions are equivalent (Thie-
mann (2006)). For canonical general relativity the master constraint which encodes the
Hamiltonian constraints can be given as:
M =
1
2
∫
σ
d3x
H(x)2√
det(q)(x)
(21)
where we have made explicit the functional dependence upon x that had previously been
suppressed. As required this constraint is such that its satisfaction implies that H(N) =
0 for all N , meaning that encodes the same constraint surface as the Hamiltonian
constraints.
Assuming the momentum constraints have been dealt with, either through reduction
or via the Dittrich methodology mentioned above, we could now proceed to construct
complete observable with respect to single master constraint by considering the flow
ατM. A family of complete observables is then constituted the one parameter set of
functions defined by the value of one partial observable when the other takes the value
s. Assuming these functions are continuous, a given complete observable can then be
taken to be invariant under the simultaneous phase space transformations generated
by all the Hamiltonian constraints taken together. Thus, as in the case of the Jacobi
theory, we arrive at an object which is defined such that it is constant along the dynam-
ical trajectory associated with the relevant ‘gauge orbit’ – but which has non-trivial
representational capacity because it is part of a family of such functions defined within
the unreduced formalism. This strange temporal structure is the hallmark of compete
observables when applied to the case of Hamiltonian constraints and we now turn to
the consideration of the associated interpretation implications for the nature of time.
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5.3. Physical States as Timeless Histories
In our discussion of the Hamiltonian constraints of canonical gravity in §2.3 we
emphasised the necessity of treating the constraints such that both the fundamental
symmetry of the theory and dynamics are respected. The problem of triviality that
beset the reductive temporal relational stance can be understood as a failure on the
second count and the problem of indeterminism that troubled the Machian temporal
relationalist stance (sans a fixed foliation) can be understood as a failure on the first.
The kernel of brilliance that allows the RDT scheme to avoid both of these problems
is to construct the families of complete observables such that the specification of each
family member is deterministic, since they are individually constant along the orbit
associated with the Hamiltonian constraints, and yet collectively they are still adequate
to represent dynamical universes because of the use of the unreduced phase space.
Thus, by endorsing the complete observables as our fundamental object we are provided
with an ontology which solves at least one aspect of the problem of time in canonical
gravity. However, unlike in a shape dynamics implementation of Machian temporal
relationalism, we are not provided with a notion of how to represent change. In the
case of our second denial, although time is absent in the sense that it’s metrical structure
has been relegated to an emergent level, it is certainly still a substantive concept since
we have temporal ordering of spatial states without our basic ontological structure.
Moreover, change is still a well defined notion, as we are free to specify the evolution of
observable quantities between hypersurfaces with respect to an ephemeris time. What
notion of change can we attach to the RDT scheme?
In order to answer this question it is instructive to consider certain key remarks
of the three physicists themselves. In discussion of the non-relativistic application of
the complete and partial observables scheme Rovelli (2002b) distinguishes the ‘physical
phase space’ as the ‘space of the orbits generated by the constraints on the constraint
surface’ (p.3). In a similar vein Dittrich (2007) defines the physical state as an ‘equiva-
lence class of phase space points’ which ‘can be identified with an n-dimensional gauge
orbit’ (p1894). So far as they apply to the Hamiltonian constraints as considered acting
on the phase space of canonical general relativity such a notion of ‘physical space space’
and ‘physical state’ imply an equation between the concept of a history and the concept
of a physical state which is radically discontinuous with conventional mechanical theory.
Typically states are taken to be instantaneous configurations and histories sequences of
such states. In standard gauge theories, where the constraints can be understood un-
problematically as generating unphysical transformations, phase space points connected
by a gauge orbit are classified as the same state because the difference between them
is taken to be unphysical. Dynamical histories are then constituted by either curves
within the unreduced phase space which are no where parallel to these orbits or, more
simply by curves, within the reduced phase space. Following the remarks of Rovelli and
Dittrich above, the interpretation of change within the complete observables scheme
still leads us to classify two points on a ‘gauge orbit’ as the same state; however this is
because the word ‘state’ is redefined such that in includes all points on the orbit. For
the case of the Hamiltonian constraints of general relativity this is simply to adopt a
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notion of state that involves no temporal specification at all, but rather implies that
the observables of a theory are smeared everywhere along entire histories. Put more
precisely, the complete observables can be understood as ‘completely non-local in the
unphysical time’ (Thiemann (2007, p.81)).
The only viable interpretation of the RDT scheme as applied to general relativity is
then one in which time and change have no part – not even at an emergent level. This
is to adopt a starkly Parmenidean view – time is purely an illusion – and thus consti-
tutes a denial of time in a much stronger sense than that involved in Machian temporal
relationalism. It is, however, unlike that involved in reductive temporal relationalism,
a denial coherent with the solutions and symmetries fundamental to canonical general
relativity. We may still describe dynamically nontrivial universes within the complete
observables formalism but almost paradoxically we are able to do this whilst disavowing
change. The key to unpicking this seemingly Gordian conceptual knot is that although
individual complete observables are eternally frozen, within the families of such ob-
servables – which, for a given solution, are only non-trivial because we have avoided
reduction – we have access to additional conceptual equipment which allows for the rep-
resentation of universes corresponding to dynamical spacetimes. Fundamentally, when
considered together a family of doubly complete observables – constructed by ‘smearing
out’ over the null directions of both the Hamiltonian constraints (or Master constraint)
and momentum constraints – constitutes a set of spacetime correlations in many way
analogous to the ‘point coincidences’ that have variously been proposed to constitute
the basic ontology of the covariant formalism.29 Thus, one must expect that a family
of complete observables constructed under the RDT methodology will give us precisely
the amount of data needed to reconstruct the 4-D metric tensor for any given (globally
hyperbolic) spacetime – including of course those with non-trivial dynamical structure.
Still, one might reasonably raise the question as to in what sense the complete ob-
servables are actually observable – clearly they cannot themselves be the subject of a
measurement as they are entirely non-local! They only feasible way of understand-
ing the relationship between genuine experimental observations/measurements and the
complete observables would be to think of a physical measurement to be constituted
by correlation between various determined values of a variable (i.e. the partial observ-
ables). Consider: i) the measurement of a certain variable corresponding to the hand
of my watch being in a certain position; and ii) the measurement of a certain vari-
able corresponding to the sun being in certain position – the essence of the complete
observables idea is that a genuine measurement is just a correlation between i) and
ii) defined without reference to any local system of co-ordinates. The question still
remains whether a satisfactory theory of measurement or even the observational data
customarily associated with general relativity (e.g. deflection of light rays by gravita-
tional bodies) can in practice be coherently reconstructed in these terms. A full analysis
29The most famous example of such a coincidence proposal is Einstein (1916) – but also see Westman
and Sonego (2008). See (Rickles, 2008, §6.1) for a discussion of the connection between the coincidence
type approach and the RDT observables
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would involve considering the construction of compete observables in the presence of
matter and would therefore go beyond our present ‘in vacuo’ analysis. The reader is
referred to Rovelli (2002a) for a promising line of thought on this front.
More generally, since (as indicated above) families of complete observables could
reasonably be understood as the canonical analogues of a set of four-dimensional space-
time correlations defined within the covariant formalism, it seems difficult to consider
the problem of reconstructing physical observations in the context of the RDT for-
malism as any more difficult than the (admittedly difficult) problem of understanding
physical observations in the context of any covariant scheme based upon spacetime
correlations (in this vein see (Earman, 2002, §5) and Healey (2004)). In essence the
compete observables approach is a disavowal of the variation of all properties across
spacetime and in this sense could be argued to merely be a canonical implementation
of the ‘coincidence-type’ approach to constructing a generally covariant ontology.
This brings us to an important qualificatory remark regarding our third denial of
time. The Parmenidean position with regard to change that is forced upon us by RDT
scheme does not equate to a denial of time either in the sense of asserting that there
exists only one time. Nor is it a position that implies that the temporal dimension is
less fundamental than the spatial dimensions – in of itself it is entirely consistent with a
four dimensional spacetime picture of the world. We can therefore see that rather than
being allied to the Machian notion of timelessness of our second denial, this third denial
is fundamentally antithetical to it. In particular, if we were to couple the application of
the complete observables scheme to the Hamiltonian constraints with an application of
the scheme to the momentum constraints as well, then the resulting doubly complete
observables will be objects smeared non-locally in the unphysical spacetime coordinates
and this is an ontology which clearly is not amenable to the Machian temporally re-
lationalist interpretation since it is predicated upon a fundamentally four rather than
three dimensional picture of reality. Thus, the choice between our two denials is ef-
fectively that between: i) loosing four dimensionality and absolute scale but retaining
change; and ii) retaining absolute scale and four dimensionality but loosing change.
6. Conclusion
Our analysis of the temporal structure of canonical general relativity under various
timeless interpretations has rested upon the need to respect the fundamentally dual role
of the Hamiltonian constraints that occur within the theory. Any approach towards
the formal structure of the theory must take into account the role of these constrains
in generating dynamics, in the context of phase space, and of generating unphysical
symmetry transformations, in the context of a hypersurface embedded within a solution.
It is in this respect that the first of our three denials of time was found to be deficient,
and it is because of this deficiency that the position of reductive temporal relationalism
can only be found to be dynamically trivialising. It is also due to a failure to respect
the duality of roles played by the Hamiltonian constraints that our second denial was
hampered by the problem of indeterminism, and, according to our analysis, it is only
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by removing the symmetry generating side of the Hamiltonian constraints and fixing a
foliation that the second denial can remain consistent. The third and final denial of time
is the starkest, and most subtle. Through implementation of the complete observables
scheme within canonical general relativity we are lead inevitably towards disavowing
change and therefore in a fundamental sense time, and yet it seems that we may also
maintain the conception of the world is terms of some aspect of the four dimensionality
of a spacetime approach.
Between the two interpretations of canonical general relativity that are allied to the
application of the complete observables scheme and the scale invariant implementation
of Machian temporal relationalism there are clearly key formal and philosophical dif-
ferences. However, the choice between these approaches, and therefore their resulting
interpretations, is as yet in want of a strong technical or empirical basis. What might
seem to be the best candidate for a criterion to motivate a choice between the two com-
peting interpretations is the prospect that each provides for a canonical quantization of
general relativity. Thus, the last word in the interpretation of the temporal structure of
canonical general relativity may, in the end, be expected to come from within a solution
to the infamous challenge of constructing a quantum theory of gravity.30
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